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Prophylactic Legislation Defi ned
My subject is the morality of prophylactic legislation. What do I mean by 'prophylactic' legislation? Let me illustrate the concept by drawing a contrast with the most famous hypothetical case in the scholarly literature of Anglo-American jurisprudence. During the course of their debate over the relation between law and morality, Lon Fuller and H. L. A. Hart disagreed about what tools are needed to discern the meaning and scope of a rule barring vehicles from a public park.¹ Hart and Fuller clashed over whether legislative purpose and considerations of morality enter into the process of discerning what Hart famously called the 'core of settled meaning'.² ey themselves did not disagree about the fact that there will be cases at the margin of this and every rule, but the example has since come to illustrate the various positions one can take on marginal applications, especially the following question: when, if ever, should ambiguous statutory language be construed to reach circumstances that were not specifi cally contemplated by the legislature? My topic concerns the relation between law and morality, but in a somewhat diff erent sense from the way in which Hart, Fuller, and others have mooted these issues. For one thing, I am interested in the question of whether a legislature ought to enact a law, not in how judges should construe laws once they are enacted. For another, I am setting aside the diffi culty of unforeseen circumstances and focusing on problems to which the legislature accurately foresees the range of applications of its legislation, although not the identities of the individuals to whom it will apply. 'Prophylactic legislation', as I shall use the term, refers to laws that the legislature deliberately writes so as to cover not only cases presenting the mischief it targets, but also some cases in which the legislature knows that the law's background justifi cation fails.
Why would a rational legislature deliberately write a law that applies to circumstances in which the law is unjustifi ed? A legislature might rationally decide to over-extend its reach for a number of reasons. It might fear that a more narrowly targeted law would be under-inclusive, and that the dangers from under-inclusion outweigh those from over-inclusion. Or, as I shall elaborate in greater detail shortly, the legislature might choose an over-inclusive rule rather than a potentially better targeted standard, because the legislature worries that the standard would confer too much discretion on those who execute and interpret it.
us, prophylactic legislation will often be rational but, I shall argue, it nonetheless raises profound moral questions whenever it jeopardizes fundamental interests for, by defi nition, it does so without suffi cient justifi cation in the circumstances to which the legislation's background purpose does not apply. Whether the moral questions can be answered, I shall argue further, depends in large part on whether reasonable people behind a veil of ignorance could be expected to assent to the prophylactic legislation. I shall explore these questions using four principal examples: speed limits; assisted suicide; torture; and detention without trial.
to enforce because of its ambiguity. Furthermore, even apart from ambiguity as perceived by the police, regulating motorway speed via a fl exible standard rather than a rigid rule would sacrifi ce the coordination advantages that rules can confer. Even allowing for diff erent degrees of compliance among the driving population, a 70-mile-per-hour rule will do a better job of moving the traffi c along at roughly the same speed than will an open-ended 'drive at a safe speed' standard. us, in the speed limit example, as in much of law, the optimal rule is sub-optimal with respect to some individuals; but the rule as a whole may still be optimal among the set of all possible rules or standards because no rule or standard can be perfect. After all, legislative goals routinely confl ict with one another. A speed limit balances motorists' interest in safety against their interest in arriving at their destinations quickly. Regulating speed via a rule rather than a standard has the virtues of precision and enforceability but the corresponding vices of over-and under-inclusion with respect to very skilled and unskilled drivers respectively; meanwhile, a standard has the opposite virtues and vices.⁴ e prophylactic nature of speed limits-that is, the fact that they require some people to drive more slowly than necessary for safety-does not by itself make speed limits morally objectionable. To be sure, someone could raise a plausible moral objection against a speed limit on the ground that it is too high. Reducing the speed limit from 70 miles per hour to 55 miles per hour would save lives and would mitigate harm to the environment. Slower speed limits mean fewer and less severe collisions, while (within the range of speeds at which people typically drive), fuel effi ciency increases as speed decreases.⁵ Burning fuel more effi ciently means pumping less carbon dioxide and other pollutants into the atmosphere.⁶ us, one could argue that reducing speed limits is a moral imperative, insofar as human lives and the health of the planet should trump the convenience that results from faster driving.
I am not now interested in whether the moral arguments for reducing the motorway speed limit from 70 to 55 miles per hour (or some other fi gure) are persuasive. I only mean to concede that they are comprehensible and plausible as moral arguments. Such arguments, however, do not take aim at the prophylactic nature of speed limits. e claim that the speed limit should be reduced is a claim that the law as it now stands is underinclusive, not a claim that it is over-inclusive.
By contrast, claims that the speed limit is too low do genuinely target the prophylactic nature of speed limits. Yet these arguments probably should not qualify as moral arguments, and even if they do, I imagine they will strike most people as very unpersuasive moral arguments. To argue for increasing the speed limit (or against decreasing it) in moral terms, notwithstanding the cost in human lives and to the environment, requires one to stake out a very strongly libertarian position. In the United States, some libertarians object to laws requiring motorists to wear seatbelts or motorcyclists to wear helmets on the ground that individuals should be permitted to choose for themselves how to evaluate the costs and benefi ts of beltless or helmetless driving.⁷ Yet even strong libertarians recognize that harm to others counts as a reason for limiting freedom.⁸ Speed limits do not merely protect you against yourself; they benefi t everyone through their pollution-reducing eff ect and they protect innocent third parties-other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians-against unsafe driving.⁹ It would take not just a libertarian but a full-fl edged anarchist to insist upon a moral right to drive as fast as one believes one can safely operate one's vehicle, when the cost of aff ording people that right will be measured in serious injuries, lost lives, and harm to the environment. In setting the speed limit at 70 rather than 55 or at 55 rather than 45, the legislature can choose to give some weight to interests in shorter driving times, but in doing so, it is not responding to moral concerns as such.
Alternatively, if you prefer, we might say that the moral concerns raised by the driver who wishes to travel very fast are easily outweighed by the ' e only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others').
⁹ I take no position on the question whether a strong libertarian could also support seatbelt laws and helmet laws on the ground that persons who suff er more severe injuries as a result of beltless and helmetless driving in fact impose a cost on others through the diversion of medical care and the loss of their productivity. I am not a strong libertarian, and thus I accept paternalistic justifi cations for seatbelt and helmet laws. countervailing considerations of safety and environmental protection. All constraints on liberty, we might say, raise prima facie moral concerns. In this view, just as a conscientious doctor attempts to 'fi rst do no harm', so a conscientious legislator ought to 'fi rst infringe no liberty'. Of course, good doctors do harm all the time, in the sense that they expose patients to serious risks, but they do so only where they calculate that the expected benefi ts of the course of treatment outweigh those risks. Likewise, if we take seriously the strong libertarian's moral objection to any speed limits, we might say that a good legislator votes for legislation only when its bene fi ts outweigh the resulting sacrifi ce of liberty. 'First infringe no liberty' would thus mean only 'do not infringe liberty gratuitously'. One can readily accept such a dictum-and thus accept that all liberty-infringing legislation poses a prima facie moral issue-without thereby accepting that all liberty-infringing legislation poses a serious moral issue.
Assisted Suicide
e picture looks very diff erent, however, where the liberty at stake is fundamental in some sense. In American constitutional law, the term 'fundamental rights' has a technical meaning, but I do not mean anything technical here.¹⁰ A fundamental liberty, as I use the term, means only a liberty that a particular legislator is willing to regard as very important. e liberty to drive at 80 rather than 70 (or 70 rather than 55) miles per hour will count as fundamental for almost no-one. e liberty to which I turn now, however, will rank as fundamental for many legislators and others.
Consider laws that impose criminal punishment on anyone who voluntarily hastens another person's death-even where the dying person is competent, in the late stages of a terminal illness, and experiencing physical discomfort that cannot be relieved by palliative care. Some ¹⁰ e term refers to those rights, whether specifi cally enumerated in the Bill of Rights or inferred from the general protection of the Due Process Clauses, that receive special substantive protection. See, e.g., Moore v City of E. Cleveland 431 US 494, 499, 506, 97 SC 1932 , 1935 , 1939 (1977 suicide will come to be seen as an acceptable and substantially less expensive alternative; that family members or doctors will exert pressure on patients to (ii) hasten their deaths; that such pressure will be most acute for women, minorities, and (iii) especially the disabled; that society more generally will place less value on the lives of the (iv) severely disabled; and that the medical profession will lose its focus on the preservation (v) of health and life.
It is by no means clear that any or all of these reasons in fact justify banning assisted suicide, even if we look only at aggregate eff ects. For example, there is good reason to think that assisted suicide bans themselves impede eff ective palliative care. Even in jurisdictions that accept the principle of 'double eff ect'-under which a doctor may prescribe whatever dose of narcotic is needed to ease pain, even if that dose kills the patient along with her pain-healthcare workers frequently under-medicate pain for fear that they will be unable to mount a successful double-eff ect defence if prosecuted.¹⁷ Legalization of assisted suicide, under this reasoning, enhances rather than undermines the quality of palliative care. Likewise with respect to the question of professional role, it is by no means clear that the appropriate stance for doctors should always be in favour of prolonging life. We might well worry that doctors who must categorically decline to assist their patients in taking so-called 'active' measures to end their lives will also be reluctant to 'let them die', a right that is typically safeguarded, even in jurisdictions in which assisted suicide is prohibited.¹⁸ Accordingly, prohibitions on assisted suicide may have a deleterious impact on physician respect for patient autonomy. (' e result of widespread and highly publicized disciplinary proceedings against physicians for purported "overprescribing" has been the encouragement of . . . underprescribing').
¹⁸ I use scare quotes because I doubt that disconnecting a patient from artifi cial hydration or respiration can be accurately characterized as passively 'letting die'. e act of 'pulling the plug' is an act, not an omission, as we can readily see by imagining that an assassin I could go on adducing reasons why one might conclude that, when one tallies the costs and benefi ts, assisted suicide ought to be legal. However, I shall assume for the sake of argument that, on balance and by whatever consequentialist calculus one uses to make these judgements, the mix of costs and benefi ts associated with prohibition of assisted suicide is preferable to the mix of costs and benefi ts associated with legalization of assisted suicide. Even so, prohibition raises moral questions because the conscientious legislator knows that, for some number of patients, the costs of prohibition clearly outweigh the benefi ts, with the result that such patients must undergo excruciating suff ering without adequate justifi cation as to their circumstances. Such patients raise a moral objection to the prophylactic nature of the assisted suicide ban.
To make the objection concrete, let us imagine a terminal patient whom I shall call James Poe.¹⁹ Poe's suff ering cannot be addressed by narcotic drugs. (Perhaps he suff ers from nausea or respiratory distress.) us, he cannot take advantage of the double-eff ect loophole in most assisted-suicide prohibitions. Let us imagine further that Poe has sufficient wealth to pay any and all medical costs associated with his further treatment but no heirs who are pressuring him to die. Suppose that Poe is not a member of any socially disadvantaged group (other than the group of people suff ering from excruciating and terminal medical conditions) and is adjudged by psychiatric experts to be of sound mind. Finally, let us suppose that Poe unequivocally and consistently expresses his desire for medication that will kill him painlessly and as soon as possible. Denying him assistance (from a doctor or anyone else) in obtaining such medication sacrifi ces his fundamental interest in avoiding suff ering, for the benefi t of others-those who would be at the receiving end of inappropriate pressure to end their lives were assisted suicide legal.
Is it a suffi cient answer to Poe to tell him that, although the rule forbidding assisted suicide deprives him of his fundamental interest in avoiding suff ering, that grave harm cannot be avoided without causing greater harm to others? Poe will no doubt object that he is not responsible for the unfortunate condition of those other people, so that it is unfair to require him to bear the costs of the deliberately over-inclusive-that pulled the plug of his mortal enemy without the enemy's consent. e assassin would be guilty of the act of murder. e diff erence between this case of killing without consent and pulling the plug with consent is not the diff erence between an act and an omission but the diff erence between an act to which consent is withheld and one to which consent is given.
¹⁹ See Compassion in Dying v Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) is, prophylactic-prohibition on assisted suicide, when the benefi ts go exclusively to others. I can tell you how the American legal system would address this question were it presented as an issue of constitutional law. e US Supreme Court rejected this sort of claim in a pair of 1997 decisions, holding that the right to physician aid in dying is not a fundamental right in the technical sense of that term. Consequently, the Court did not demand a truly compelling justifi cation from the legislatures of the states of Washington and New York.²⁰ But even if the Court had found that Poe had a fundamental right, that would not have ended the inquiry.²¹ e Court would have faced the further question whether the states had advanced sufficiently strong justifi cations for the prohibitions.²² In technical language, the Court would have asked whether the prohibitions were the 'least restrictive means' of advancing a 'compelling interest'.²³ In some sense, that's just legalese for the proposition that when the government infringes on very important liberties, it must have very good reasons for doing so. Even if the putative right to assisted suicide does not lead courts to examine the reasons given for its prohibition-as it would not in either the United States²⁴ or the United Kingdom²⁵-we would nonetheless expect legislators in any constitutional democracy to ask themselves whether they have very good reasons for enacting laws that infringe on very important liberties such as Poe's claimed right of assisted suicide. To borrow the doctrinal test described above, we would want legislators to ask whether there is a less restrictive means of accomplishing the obviously important ends of protecting patients against coercion, ensuring the availability of palliative care, and so forth. ²⁰ See Washington v Glucksberg, ibid, 728, 2271; Vacco v Quill 521 US 793, 799, 809, 117 SC 2293 , 2297 , 2302 (1997 .
²¹ For an outline of the steps in fundamental rights analysis, see E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 2002), 764-8. ²² See, e.g., Roe v Wade 410 US 113, 155, 93 SC 705, 728 (1973) ('Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justifi ed only by a "compelling state interest", and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake') (citations removed).
²³ See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 126, 109 SC 2829 , 2836 (1989 In other words, we would want the conscientious legislator to ask whether the burden on Poe is truly necessary to gain the benefi ts that accrue to others from a prohibition on assisted suicide. e answer appears to turn on a further, empirical question: would it be possible to gain the advantages of a ban on assisted suicide through means short of outright prohibition, for example via stringent regulation and expanded government funding for palliative care? Even though we have been assuming that the aggregate benefi ts of the assisted suicide ban outweigh its aggregate costs, the answer to this question might still be yes. at is to say, it is possible that the benefi ts of an outright ban on assisted suicide outweigh its costs, but that regulations falling short of an outright ban would provide the same benefi ts with fewer costs. In that case, it would appear to be impossible to justify the prophylactic ban on assisted suicide as applied to Poe (absent the sort of absolute deontological objections to assisted suicide that I have bracketed). For, in his case, the ban operates as pure cost.
Suppose, however, that the complete ban on assisted suicide truly is optimal with respect to aggregate costs and benefi ts, so that the legislature cannot make exceptions for people like Poe without opening the door to the sorts of pressures on others that it fi nds unacceptable. By whatever measure a legislator uses to determine such things-aggregate pleasures minus pains, say, or 'utiles'-the harms from permitting any exceptions outweigh the benefi ts. Even so, presumably Poe would still object in exactly the terms I stated above: why should he have to endure excruciating pain to prevent third parties over whom he has no infl uence from harming other third parties with whom he has no relationship? Anglo-American law traditionally imposes no duty to rescue strangers,²⁶ and even in those jurisdictions that depart from the traditional rule, there is no duty to rescue strangers where doing so would entail excruciating pain.²⁷ Both the traditional rule and the limited nature of the departures (St. Paul, Minnn: West, 1984) , 374 ('the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation . . . to go to the aid of another').
²⁶ See Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
²⁷ See, e.g., Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 12 s 519(a) (1973) ('[a] person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself . . . give reasonable assistance') (emphasis added); Rhode Island Gen. Laws ss. 11-56-1 (1956) ('[a]ny person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to, or has suff ered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance') (emphasis added). 
Torture
Answering Poe's objection would seem to be an urgent matter, because the inability to justify prophylactic legislation would undermine much of what the state does-and much of what I think most sensible people would want it to do. So, can the state give a persuasive answer to Poe? at may depend on how we understand the nature of the prohibition on assisted suicide. We might put Poe's objection in its strongest form with an analogy to torture. Suppose that John Doe is a perfectly healthy, completely innocent person who has the misfortune to be the son of a kidnapper threatening to kill another group of completely innocent people that she is holding captive. Could the state torture Doe in order to induce his mother to free her captives? e standard answer in moral philosophy-and one that certainly comports with my own moral intuition-is no.
Poe can claim that his situation is indistinguishable from Doe's. By threatening doctors with criminal liability if they assist him in hastening his death, the state prolongs Poe's agony-in eff ect tortures him-in order to prolong the lives of other people, those who do not desire aid in dying but would be pressured to end their lives prematurely under a regime of legal assisted suicide. e state can no more torture the innocent Poe through its criminal laws, he says, than it can torture the innocent Doe by hiring a Torquemada.
Not everyone will fi nd this analogy persuasive, and it is tempting simply to dismiss it by relying on something like the act/omission distinction. When the state hires Torquemada actually to torture Doe, the state is taking action. By contrast, even if a law forbidding assisted suicide is not exactly an omission, the state may appear to us to be less responsible for Poe's suff ering than for Doe's. After all, the state does not infl ict Poe's suff ering; his underlying medical condition does. e state does forbid Poe from obtaining assistance in taking the one measure, suicide, that would relieve his suff ering but, unlike in Doe's case, Poe's suff ering is merely the unfortunate by-product of the state's cost-justifi ed policy. By contrast, the state acting through Torquemada affi rmatively sets out to cause Doe's excruciating pain. One could plausibly think that there is a moral distinction between deliberately causing suff ering to achieve otherwise laudable state objectives-rescuing Doe's mother's hostages-and incidentally preventing the cessation of suff ering to achieve otherwise laudable state objectives-avoiding coerced deaths, making palliative care available, and so forth.²⁸ But even if it is morally worse for the state to aim at causing great suffering to innocents in order to rescue more innocents than it is for the state to cause suff ering to innocents as the incidental cost of other action, does it follow that it is morally permissible for the state to take deliberate actions that cause innocents to suff er incidentally? Perhaps a better analogy than torture is what we euphemistically call 'collateral damage' in wartime. e law of war forbids belligerent nations from targeting civilians²⁹ and requires that strikes against combatants minimize civilian casualties,³⁰ but minimization is not prohibition. In war, high-value enemy forces can be targeted even though some civilians will be injured or killed as a collateral consequence.³¹ Does the same principle apply in civilian life? It would seem to. In the United States, for example, police carry and use fi rearms against suspected criminals, with the predictable consequence that sometimes they inadvertently injure or kill innocent bystanders.³² Similarly, throughout the world vaccines against various deadly diseases predictably cause a small number of the people vaccinated to contract the disease itself (or suff er other ill eff ects); yet that fact should not prevent the state from mandating vaccination so as to greatly reduce the number of people who would otherwise contract the disease by other means.³³ e person who contracts the disease from the vaccine would appear to be at least as well ²⁸ See S. F. Colb, 'Why is Torture "Diff erent" and How "Diff erent" is it?' (forthcoming in Volume 30 of Cardozo L. Rev. (2009) 
e Veil of Ignorance
To be sure, as a matter of public health, it may not make a great deal of sense for the state to mandate full vaccination. So-called 'herd immunity' will work well enough to prevent the spread of most diseases, even with vaccination rates falling somewhat short of 100 per cent.³⁴ Moreover, imprisoning the parents of minor children or others who resist vaccination might prove counter-productive, inspiring distrust of public health authorities. ese are legitimate practical objections that I shall simply set aside; I will assume that, for some particular disease, mandatory vaccination is essential for public health. In these circumstances, what justifi cation can the state give to the vaccine's victim? e state can say that, ex ante, the person who turned out to be a victim of the vaccine was much more likely to be its benefi ciary. A rational calculator, not knowing whether her child will be the 1 in 10,000 who contracts the disease or one of the 9,999 children who benefi t from the vaccine's protection against it, would play the odds and have the vaccine administered. In this instance, John Rawls's metaphor of a veil of ignorance works especially well.³⁵ Prior to the vaccine's administration, no-one knows whether her child will be one of the many benefi ciaries or one of the small number of victims.
Perhaps more importantly, legislators do not know ex ante which particular individuals or groups of individuals will end up among the vaccine's victims. Conscientious legislators who aim to adjust benefi ts and burdens fairly among their constituents will have no systematic reason to under-count or over-count the welfare of any individual or group. If it is rational for any parent to prefer the risks from the vaccine to the risks from the disease if the vaccination is not given, it is rational for every parent to prefer the former risks. us, on the assumption that mandatory vaccination truly serves public health better than voluntary vaccination, in mandating vaccination, the legislature does not in fact prefer the wellbeing of the 9,999 to that of the one: it calculates that all 10,000 would rationally prefer the smaller risk to the larger one. Critics of Rawls have sometimes objected that the veil of ignorance is unrealistic.³⁶ How, they ask, could people living in the diverse circumstances in which persons in multicultural democracies fi nd themselves, truly assess what the basic structure of their political institutions should look like without at least some account-even if unconscious-of their own particularity?³⁷ at is a sound objection to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance but not much of an objection to mandatory vaccination, for however diff erently individuals are situated with respect to other questions, they are nearly all in roughly the same position with respect to vaccines: nearly every rational actor would take the small risk of contracting the disease from the vaccine rather than the substantially larger risk of contracting the disease if unvaccinated.
I say 'nearly all' and 'nearly every' rather than 'all' and 'every' because a small number of people object to vaccination on religious grounds, and for them the calculus is quite diff erent.³⁸ For someone who believes that vaccination will result in eternal damnation, even a substantial risk of contracting a deadly disease if unvaccinated-10, 50, or even 90 per cent, say-may be a risk worth running. In asking such religious persons to don the veil of ignorance, we do potentially run foul of the broader objection to the Rawlsian veil.
e treatment of religious objections to laws of general applicability is an important question for any constitutional democracy, but we can bracket it here. Within American constitutional law, religious objectors are never entitled to faith-based exemptions from truly neutral laws,³⁹ although many of our states do provide for some religious exemptions⁴⁰ and a federal statute requires the federal government to justify ³⁶ For a summary of and response to such criticism, see S. Mulhall and A. Swift, 'Rawls and Communitarianism' in S. Freeman (ed. the application of general laws to religious objectors.⁴¹ Even in jurisdictions that do provide some religious exemptions, however, the government is not completely disabled from applying its general laws where they happen to infringe on religious practices.⁴² Rather, the government must simply meet a stricter standard of justifi cation.⁴³ In our example, the health of minor children-assuming the vaccination provides significant protection against a deadly disease-would likely count as suffi cient grounds for overcoming the religious scruples of parents,⁴⁴ although in actual practice all but two American states have chosen to exempt parents with such scruples from vaccination requirements.⁴⁵ For my present purposes, it is not important to resolve the question whether the vaccination example is a case in which rational citizens have more or less homogeneous ex ante interests and wishes. My point is only that if we identify some such example of roughly homogeneous interests and wishes-whether it involves vaccination or something else-the particularity-based objection to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance lacks bite.
But what about cases in which we agree that people are not ex ante similarly situated? ese cases fall into two broad categories: those in which persons objecting to having to bear the cost of prophylactic legislation are politically dominant and those in which the objectors are politically subordinate. I shall illustrate these cases with examples based, respectively, on torture and the detention of alleged terrorists.
A Moral Right to Demand Torture?
Suppose you are a conscientious legislator who does not believe on deontological grounds that torture is always wrong. Nonetheless, you ⁴¹ Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1993. RFRA was found unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 507, 511, 117 SC 2157 , 2160 (1997 favour an absolute ban on torture (such as the one contained in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) on prophylactic grounds.⁴⁶ In principle, you believe that there are cases in which torture would be morally permissible or even required-for example, the well-known 'ticking bomb' scenario: the authorities believe to a high degree of certainty that they have in custody a person who knows but refuses to divulge the location of a ticking bomb that will cause catastrophic harm to the civilian population. Nonetheless, you favour the absolute ban on torture because you believe that, if the law makes any exceptions for ticking bombs, the authorities will start to hear bombs ticking everywhere, and an extremely limited exception will become the de facto rule. ese are reasonable grounds for favouring a blanket ban on torture but suppose that a potential victim of the ticking bomb, whom I'll call Joe Blow, comes along and raises the following moral objection: in the particular case in which your torture ban prevents the authorities from fi nding and defusing the bomb that will kill or maim me, you are imposing on me, an innocent, a duty to rescue-or what amounts to the same thing, a duty to sacrifi ce life or limb for-likely terrorists. Blow claims a moral right to have the state engage in torture for his benefi t.
How might you respond to Blow's objection? To begin, you can point out that you are not demanding his sacrifi ce for the benefi t of the terrorist. If you favoured the torture ban on deontological grounds-if you thought torture were inconsistent with human dignity, say-then you would need to explain to Blow why your squeamishness about infl icting awful suff ering on a suspected terrorist outweighs the suff ering and death of Blow and many of his fellow innocent citizens. (You would likely rely on the act/omission distinction or something similar.) However, by hypothesis, that is not the basis for your support of an absolute torture ban. Instead, you worry that allowing any exceptions will lead to the torture of innocent people or people from whom information could be obtained by other means. If the risks are as you calculate, then this shift to the ex ante perspective is, once again, an eff ective response to the moral objection to prophylactic legislation. However, even if the aggregate risks are indeed as you calculate, they will not be distributed evenly. If Blow is a member of an ethnic, national, or racial group whose members are responsible-or simply believed by the authorities to be responsible-for a disproportionate share of terrorist acts, Blow may indeed benefi t from the torture ban. But if he were in that group, then ex ante at least, he would be quite unlikely to demand that the legislature rescind the torture ban. Someone demanding that the state be prepared to engage in torture in the ticking bomb scenario is much more likely to be a member of a group that envisages the state torturing people other than-and diff erent from-himself.
us, in this case, the veil of ignorance appears to succumb to the standard objection that people are situated diff erently. A large number of people believe that they will never be tortured, and thus some of them want the state to use torture, at least in extreme cases. (Based on the popularity of the American television show '24', in which hero Jack Bauer routinely tortures bad guys, 'some' may actually be 'a great many'.)⁴⁷ A smaller number of people believe that, if the state uses torture, it will be against people with their own characteristics. Ex ante, the calculation of whether torture is justifi ed will be diff erent for the two groups. Majority group members may rationally conclude that it is worth increasing the risk of torturing innocents in order to preserve the safety of the larger innocent population because members of the majority group will not be among the additional innocents risking torture. Minority group members are more likely to make the opposite calculation.
e conscientious legislator who believes that, all things considered, the absolute torture ban is justifi ed, need not give ground to the purportedly moral objection of Joe Blow and others like him. What they demand is that the state shift the balance of risks and benefi ts from torture away from the majority and onto an ethnic, national, or religious minority.
is is not a demand in the name of morality addressed to the conscience of the legislator but a demand in the name of self-interest addressed to the legislator's own interest in re-election. Legislators have suffi ciently ample incentives to sacrifi ce minority interests for majority ones that we need not worry much when it is claimed that a law sacrifi ces majority interests for minority ones.
Indeed, the legislature's incentive to favour-or at least not to disadvantage-the majority is so great that one is tempted to look for other explanations for laws, like the absolute torture ban, that seem to benefi t the minority at the majority's expense. Again putting aside the deontological objections to torture-which will also tend to benefi t the minoritywe can see at least one reason why the legislature might conclude that, even from the perspective of the majority alone, an absolute torture ban is cost-justifi ed: the legislature might conclude that offi cially permitting any torture will actually increase the net risk of terrorism, because it will inspire additional hatred for the state. In one of his few commendable displays of good sense, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked in a 2003 'snowfl ake' whether US and allied forces were 'capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against' the United States, thereby acknowledging that overly aggressive actions can be counterproductive.⁴⁸ Another explanation for the torture ban could be that the legislature does not in fact believe it will work. at may sound like a cynical view, and some versions of this approach are cynical. For example, President Bush made a great show of signing into law the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, including a blanket prohibition on torture, only to issue an accompanying 'signing statement' that appears to reserve the power to engage in torture anyway.⁴⁹ ere is also, however, a less cynical basis on which a legislator could support a torture ban despite knowing that it will not be fully eff ective. Suppose a legislator thinks that the state should sometimes torture, but only in the very extreme version of the ticking bomb scenario. Any formal exception in the law would have the unintended eff ect of authorizing more torture, but in suffi ciently extreme circumstances, the authorities can be expected to break the law and engage in torture. us, the very fact that police will be tempted to ignore an absolute torture ban when the stakes are suffi ciently high could make the absolute ban the optimal rule. In other words, if the conscientious legislator believes that the right answer to the question 'how often should the state torture?' is not 'never' but 'very very rarely', then an absolute ban might come closer to achieving that outcome than any other rule. A legislative 'never' would mean 'hardly ever' in practice. I cannot say with any confi dence whether these or other reasons explain why we see complete bans on torture. I can say that, whether the torture ban is optimal or not in the aggregate, Joe Blow's purportedly moral objection to the state's refusal to engage in torture rings hollow, even if we set aside deontological justifi cations for a complete torture ban. e objection rings hollow because the legislative process is well designed to take account of the interests of people like Blow.
We can say nearly the same thing about assisted suicide. Although I do not believe that, all things considered, assisted suicide bans are costjustifi ed, if one did think that they were cost-justifi ed in the aggregate, the ex ante distribution of benefi ts and risks would suffi ciently answer our hypothetical James Poe, who objects to the imposition on him of the costs needed to avoid harms that a regime of legal assisted suicide would supposedly infl ict on others. By hypothesis, assisted suicide bans protect society's most vulnerable members, and so if Poe opposes the ban, he is unlikely to be such a person. Instead, like Joe Blow (who complains about the torture ban), Poe should be able to get a fair hearing in the legislature.⁵⁰ More broadly, we can say that the heterogeneity of the distribution of risks does not render prophylactic legislation immoral where the dominant group bears the added risk of a law's overbreadth. is conclusion has obvious implications for other sorts of laws that protect minorities at the seeming expense of the majority, but I shall not address them here.⁵¹
Detention Without Full Trial
Members of minority groups who bear the brunt of prophylactic legislation present a much stronger moral objection, however. Let us ⁵⁰ Recall that I am assuming that religious opposition to assisted suicide is not the reason for the prohibition. If that assumption does not hold, then Poe may well count as a religious minority whose welfare the legislature should not be able to sacrifi ce for the welfare of others.
⁵¹ American constitutionalists will see in my analysis a healthy dose of so-called 'representation-reinforcing' theory of the sort propounded most famously by the late John Hart Ely. See generally J. H. Ely, Democracy & Distrust (London: Harvard University Press, 1980) . Ely argued for careful judicial scrutiny of laws that disadvantage politically disempowered groups such as racial minorities and other victims of prejudice, but maintained that the outputs of a reasonably well-functioning political process should not be secondguessed by courts when they disadvantage majority interests for minority ones. See Ely, Democracy at 135-79. consider their objection in the context of detention without a full civilian trial.
A familiar maxim states that it is better for ten guilty men to go free than for one innocent to be unjustly convicted. Common-law legal systems institutionalize this maxim through a number of procedural mechanisms, including: trial by jury in serious criminal cases; the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and the exclusion of evidence obtained through means that cast doubt on its reliability.⁵² However, since 11 September 2001 in the US and 7 July 2005 in the UK, some commentators have argued that the ten-to-one ratio is inappropriate for persons suspected of terrorism.⁵³ Two rationales might be thought to justify relaxing the procedural rules that implement the ten-to-one principle. First, terrorists who commit their crimes by suicide cannot be deterred by the threat of after-the-fact criminal punishment. us, authorities must intervene before they have completed their plans, but separating those with innocent intentions from those with guilty intentions will often prove more diffi cult than determining guilt for a completed act. Indeed, some of the persons the state may wish to detain will not have even committed an inchoate crime, but are nonetheless highly dangerous. e perceived need for early apprehension may create a concomitant perceived need for a lower threshold of certainty before the state apprehends and detains people.
Second, terrorists aim to produce destruction on a greater scale than other criminals. e cost of freeing ten ordinary murderers in order to avoid wrongly incarcerating one innocent person accused of murder is, according to the ten-to-one maxim, a high cost but one worth bearing. It does not follow that the cost is worth bearing when we have ten extraordinary murderers. In other words, to the extent that the ten-to-one maxim encapsulates a civil-libertarian-weighted cost-benefi t analysis, the analysis may be diff erent for terrorism.
In my country, these factors may partly explain why the Bush administration has generally sought to avoid trying terrorism suspects in civilian courts according to the usual rules of the criminal justice ⁵² For an overview of US criminal law procedure and the ways in which it 'refl ects a desire to minimize the chance of convicting an innocent person even at the price of increasing the chance that a guilty person may escape', see LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure (St. Paul, Minn: West 2004) , 30.
⁵³ See e.g. J. Tyrangiel, ' e Jihadi Next Door?' 168 Time, 3 July 2006, 26 (arguing that 'when a handful of terrorists can trigger an exponentially larger tragedy . . . "[y]ou fi nd a reversal of the general posit that it is suffi cient that 100 guilty men go free so that one innocent man is not convicted" ') (quoting Ronald Susskind). If we take the ten-to-one ratio as the background operating assumption of common-law legal systems, then the use of any set of procedures that substitutes a higher ratio of false positives to false negatives can be understood as prophylactic legislation. Suppose, for example, a legislator believes that, given the need for early intervention and given the size of the harm perpetrated by terrorists, the proper maxim is 'better to imprison three innocent people at Guantánamo Bay than to mistakenly free one determined terrorist'. Based on this one-to-three rather than tento-one ratio (of false negatives to false positives), the government would use procedures that reduce the number of dangerous people released but at the cost of increasing the number of innocent and harmless people imprisoned or killed. Now suppose that, when we apply the same discount factor as we apply in civilian life to produce the ten-to-one rule, we obtain the one-to-three rule for terrorism cases. In that case, the conscientious legislator could give our by-now-familiar answer to someone who objects to the increased risk of erroneous incarceration or execution for terrorism suspects: ex ante, the risk is justifi ed because it applies the proper discount factor for balancing your risk of being improperly incarcerated by the state against your risk of being harmed or killed by a terrorist improperly released or never apprehended by the state.
However, we also have our familiar rejoinder: the risk of being mistakenly imprisoned as a terrorist and the risk of being harmed or killed by a terrorist who was not detained because the authorities lacked suffi cient evidence to hold him are heterogeneously distributed. People in certain national, ethnic, and religious minority groups-especially Muslimswill suff er a much higher risk of erroneous imprisonment than will the majority population.⁵⁸ Providing fewer procedural rights to aliens than to citizens-as under the Military Commissions Act in the United Statesexacerbates the problem, because it subjects precisely those without political power to the increased risk.⁵⁹ However, the problem persists even if we envisage a special response to terrorism that applies equally to citizens and non-citizens, because, as a practical matter, the nominally inclusive programme will still expose Muslims (and some members of other minority groups) to greater false positive risk than the false positive risk borne by the balance of the population.
And that will be so even if we assume no bad faith or invidious prejudice on the part of the authorities. e fact-and I'll assume it is a fact for purposes of this example-that a Muslim is more likely to be a terrorist than a non-Muslim, even though the overwhelming majority of Muslims are perfectly innocent, will lead the authorities to concentrate their investigation on individuals who happen to be Muslim. at will be true even if the authorities specifi cally disavow religion as an element of a 'terrorist profi le', because, by hypothesis, simply following specifi c clues will more frequently lead the authorities to Muslim suspects.
us we come to the hard question: can the conscientious legislator authorize counter-terrorism policies that, while cost-justifi ed in the aggregate, expose innocent members of a religious minority group to a substantially greater risk of erroneous detention than the risk that the balance of the population faces? In my discussion of torture, I concluded that there is no strong moral objection of potential terrorism victims to a decision not to expose members of a minority group to a greater risk, and that answer should not change whether the risk is torture or unwarranted imprisonment. So the conscientious legislator can vote to provide fulldress civilian court criminal trials to all terrorism suspects; if she does so, she might pay a political price but she should be able to sleep at night.
However, suppose our conscientious legislator is either attentive to polls or an insomniac. Can she give a persuasive answer to the moral objection of the minority victim of prophylactic legislation? Before addressing that question, I want to register a caveat concerning how we should measure costs and benefi ts.
e Caveat: Total Risk First, the caveat. I have been talking as though the proper way for a legislator to assess the distribution of risk from a proposed law is to look at the distribution of risks and benefi ts from that law alone. Yet a better approach may be to tally up the distribution of risks and benefi ts from the entirety of government policy. If the optimal policy with respect to one phenomenon-vaccination against disease A, say-exposes one group to a disproportionately greater share of the risk than the general population faces, might that policy be justifi ed by the fact that this group disproportionately benefi ts from some other policy-such as vaccination against disease B-or even something completely unrelated, such as trial by jury in criminal cases? I see no reason in principle why, from the ex ante perspective, a conscientious legislator could not take this approach. Doing so enables the legislature to pursue policies that are optimal in terms of their aggregate costs and benefi ts without succumbing to distributional objections, by balancing the distributional consequences across diff erent policy domains. We might call this approach 'distributional arbitrage'.
ere are, however, at least two substantial diffi culties with distributional arbitrage. e fi rst is availability. Across policy domains, the same people tend to get the short end of the stick. For example, the distributional arbitrageur looking for a policy to balance the disproportionate risk that the poor will bear from a decision to site a sewage plant in their neighbourhood will fi nd that most of the other policies on off er also disproportionately expose the poor to risk.
To be sure, government programmes of redistribution, including entitlements and progressive taxation, do disproportionately benefi t the poor, including the most disadvantaged members of disadvantaged minority groups. But this brings us to the second diffi culty with distributional arbitrage: once we resolve to consider total benefi ts and burdens of government policy, there is no natural baseline from which to measure benefi ts and burdens.
Can the conscientious legislator vote for a regime of hyper-aggressive criminal law enforcement that will disproportionately expose poor minorities to the risk of erroneous imprisonment on the ground that most of these people disproportionately benefi t from progressive taxation? If so, 
Conclusion
In the end, I doubt that the legislature can give a persuasive response to the disadvantaged minority group member who is subject to prophylactic legislation which, even if optimal in the aggregate, fails of its background justifi cation in his case-such as the law-abiding Muslims who are imprisoned or tortured in the mistaken belief that they pose a terrorist threat. Indeed, I am not even very confi dent in the response I have outlined for cases of homogeneously distributed risks and risks that advantaged members of the society disproportionately bear. Recall that, in these cases, the conscientious legislator says to the unfortunate soul caught up by the overbroad law that he was an ex ante benefi ciary. But can't he still complain?
Suppose that the fi ve starving survivors of a shipwreck realize that they must kill and eat one of their number if the remaining four are to have a hope of surviving until they are rescued. e person who draws the short straw was an ex ante benefi ciary of the procedure because a four-infi ve chance of living another few days is better than the near-certainty of death in another few hours. Still, that hardly ensures the morality of the procedure once the procedurally fair decision has been made to sacrifi ce him for the benefi t of the others-even in the case in which he consents to the lottery. It would take an extraordinary commitment to procedural fairness for the person drawing the short straw not to regard himself (in his last moments of life) as having been wronged. Now note that, in the case of prophylactic legislation, the people who end up bearing the brunt of the law's deliberate overbreadth need not have actually agreed with the law, so long as, ex ante, our conscientious legislator believes that the law would be in their interest. James Poe, whose suff ering is prolonged by the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide, can liken himself to the shipwreck survivor who does not consent to the drawing of straws, is outvoted by his fellow survivors, and then draws the short straw. Perhaps in the case of the shipwreck and for all prophylactic legislation that impinges on fundamental interests, we expect that grim necessity will overwhelm considerations of morality. If so, we might say that prophylactic legislation, like the survivors' cannibalism lottery, is sometimes forgivable, not that it is moral. We cannot even say that much where the legislation imposes disproportionately greater risks on vulnerable groups than on others. e conscientious legislator may thus be tempted simply to avoid prophylactic legislation whenever it would implicate fundamental interests. But even that path will often be unavailable because there will be no way to craft a legal principle that is not over-inclusive with respect to some people. A categorical rule forbidding torture will potentially deprive terrorism victims of their lives because the state fails to discover and defuse the ticking bomb; a rule permitting torture will result in the torture of innocents; and the state cannot simply do nothing.
us, fi nally, with moral objections in all directions, the legislator may feel liberated to do whatever he wishes to maximize utility or pursue whatever other policy aims he favours. In my view, that approach would also be inappropriate. e impossibility of overcoming moral objections is not a reason to fail to grapple with them. In the recent past, and especially in the halls of power in my own country, public offi cials have far too quickly set aside moral considerations in favour of short-sighted views of expediency. Morality may sometimes need to bow to expediency, but it should not go down without a fi ght.
